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1 Alternative names for the NFRs
are adaptive or McCallum rules;
however, throughout the text
we will use NFR.
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E
conomic theory suggests that monetary
policy tends to have an inﬂationary bias
when monetary policy is discretionary
(Barro and Gordon, 1983). This bias can
be eliminated if the monetary authority is
able and willing to precommit itself to a
policy rule that would ensure price stability
in the long run.  Although in practice mon-
etary authorities are unwilling to renounce
their discretionary powers and adhere
strictly to a rule, they still could beneﬁt
from using the rule as a guide for policy
discussion. Under such an approach, the
policy rule provides information that would
help make short-run policy decisions con-
sistent with the long-run goal of price stability.
Nominal feedback rules (NFRs), ﬁrst
suggested by McCallum (1987), are one
form of policy rules that have recently
received considerable attention.1 The pri-
mary motive for NFRs is to overcome the
shortcomings of Friedman’s constant-
money-growth rule, which does not take
into account changes in the velocity of
money. The NFRs are designed such that
the monetary authority does not need to
rely on a speciﬁc model of the economy in
order to implement them. The novel
feature of the NFR is its feedback
mechanism, which speciﬁes precise adjust-
ments in the policy instrument when the
nominal target variable deviates from its
desired path. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide
a nontechnical description of NFRs and
their use for monetary policy.  The recent
spate of studies with NFRs primarily has
assessed a rule that deﬁnes the monetary
base as the instrument and nominal GDP
as the nominal target; the scope of NFRs
permits other speciﬁcations, however.
NFRs can be used to simulate ﬂuctuations
in nominal variables of interest, or to indi-
cate the current stance of actual monetary
policy and provide the monetary authori-
ties a reference for setting monetary policy.
This survey discusses both uses for NFRs;
however, greater attention is given to the
indicator model with an empirical illustra-
tion for Switzerland.
The indicator model aims to inform
policymakers on a timely basis of the
likely effect on the baseline rate of
inﬂation of current changes in the policy
instrument.  The baseline rate of inﬂation
is deﬁned as a backward-looking, short-
term trend rate of inﬂation.  Thus, if
unanticipated shocks have raised the base-
line rate of inﬂation, policymakers would
like to know if their current actions are
geared toward reducing baseline inﬂation
gradually, a course that would not destabi-
lize the real economy and ﬁnancial
markets.  
The structure of the paper is as follows:
The ﬁrst section presents a framework for
NFRs.  The next section reviews normative
studies that attempt to show how well
NFRs could stabilize the growth of the
nominal target variable around its desired
path.  The third section highlights the use
of NFRs as indicator models.  These posi-
tive exercises demonstrate how the
indicator models with nominal feedback
can be used as a reference guide for mone-
tary policy.  In the ﬁnal section, we discuss
evidence regarding the potential effective-
ness of the indicator model as a policy
indicator for the Swiss monetary base.  
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A FRAMEWORK FOR NOMI-
NAL FEEDBACK RULE
To illustrate the principal features of the
NFR, we present a framework that links the
instrument variable with the nominal target.
The system or policy model is atheoretic
and is based completely on lagged informa-
tion. Three main features make the NFR
framework especially useful:  First, it deﬁnes
a long-run target path for the nominal
target variable.  Second, it incorporates
forecasts of the relationship between the
policy instrument and the nominal target
variable.  And, third, it speciﬁes the speed
with which policy will adjust in response
to a gap between actual and desired levels
of the nominal target variable.  The generic
feedback rule, with all variables in logs,
takes the following form:
Equation 1 represents the NFR and consists
of four elements:  the policy instrument that
the monetary authorities can control, ;
the nominal target variable, ; the baseline
growth rate for the nominal target variable,
; a forecast of the relationship between
the nominal target and the instrument,
; 
and a feedback parameter, .  Equation 2
deﬁnes the baseline level, x*t, to be a func-
tion of the baseline growth rate, l0, and the
previous baseline, x*t-1.  The key aspects of
Equations 1 and 2 are discussed below in
greater detail.
Controllable Instruments
The NFR assumes that the dependent
variable in Equation 1 is a controllable
instrument of the monetary authorities.
This assumption narrows their choice of
instruments to either the monetary base,
the exchange rate, or a short-term interest
rate.  Empirical studies have focused on
either the monetary base or the interest rate
as the instrument variable.  In the empirical
illustration of an indicator model for Switzer-
land, we use the monetary base as the central
bank’s control variable to conform with the
base targeting policy of the Swiss National
Bank.  In many other countries, the central
bank uses a short-term interest rate as its
policy instrument.  The inﬂuence of lagged
changes in the instrument is not modeled
directly in Equation 1, but they may have
an indirect inﬂuence in the forecasts.  Changes
in the instrument are dictated by the right-
hand-side components of the NFR model.
Therefore, changes in the instrument, , are
not necessarily associated with changes in
the objectives of policy; instead, they may
arise from a narrowing or widening of the
gap in (x*- x)t-1, or from the forecasted
effect of policy actions on the growth of the
nominal target variable.
The Role of Forecasts in Feedback Rules
The models that use NFRs include
forecasts of the ratio between the nominal
target variable, , and the instrument, ,
to identify the change in the instrument
believed to be consistent with the monetary
authority’s pre-committed nominal target.
The forecast provides information regarding
both the current instrument setting and
accurate forecasts ensure achievement of
the current period’s desired rate of growth
in the nominal target variable: 
.
One way to make the forecasts is to
take a moving average of 
.
McCallum (1987) uses this strategy to 
produce four-year moving average (MA)
forecasts of base velocity growth. The
attractive feature of the MA forecasts is
that they are simple to produce and can be
easily veriﬁed by the public. Dueker (1993)
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2 The stability conditions for the
instruments are not analytically
speciﬁed in the simulation exer-
cises.
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and Thornton (1993), however, show that
simulation exercises with Equation 1 are
sensitive to the choice of the forecast spec-
iﬁcation. Dueker (1993) uses an alternative
forecasting technique:  a time-varying
coefﬁcient model with heteroscedastic
errors. The primary advantage of forecasts
from a time-varying coefﬁcient model, rel-
ative to MA forecasts, is that the forecasting
information set includes not only past
values of the dependent variable, but also a
host of explanatory variables. Moreover,
the forecasts can adapt to structural breaks
in the relationships between the dependent
and explanatory variables. The same fore-
casting method is used in the indicator
model of Dueker and Fischer (1996a),
which is discussed later in this article.
Feedback Mechanisms
The feedback mechanism is deﬁned
generally in terms of the long-run nominal
target variable.  The gap, x*- x, acts as an
error-correction mechanism, in that the model
allows for corrective feedback when values
of xt-1 deviate from the baseline value, x*t-1.
As in error-correction models, NFR models
are confronted with a trade-off between
gradualism and immediate restoration of
the target.  Small  values of the feedback
parameter, l1, provide little in the way of
corrective adjustments.  Setting l1 equal to
zero results in period-by-period targeting of
growth in xt at the rate l0.  Values of l1 that
are too large, on the other hand, can result
in over-correction in the form of explosive
oscillations that are dynamically unstable.
Valid NFRs should not exhibit instrument
instability, which is the tendency for the
instrument to oscillate explosively.  Instru-
ment instability is an important criterion
for selecting a feedback parameter, l1, espe-
cially when the NFR is used for policy
simulation.  We emphasize, however, that
instrument instability presents a problem
primarily when an NFR model is simulated
as an inviolable rule, rather than used as an
indicator model.2
An NFR model can achieve a greater
degree of realism if it acknowledges that
policymakers have multiple objectives to
which they do not attach constant weights.
If a central bank has more than one objec-
tive— say price stability and minimizing
uncertainty in ﬁnancial markets—it is pos-
sible to introduce a second feedback
mechanism and Equation 1 becomes:
(1¢)  
.
Dueker and Fischer (1996a,b) consider
the case in which a central bank pursues
the dual objectives of price and exchange-
rate stability. In this case, l1 and l2 represent
the feedback parameters in the price and the
exchange-rate feedback mechanisms.  To
add further realism by allowing the impor-
tance attached to each objective to change
over time, Dueker and Fischer (1996a,b)
permit the values of the two feedback para-
meters to vary over time.  In the section on
indicator models with nominal feedback, we
provide a more detailed discussion of this.
In general, one can think of zt as a
variable that receives the attention of the
monetary authority over relatively short-
run horizons, after which attention returns
to the long-run nominal target, x.  The case
where xt is the price level and zt is some
measure of ﬁnancial-market volatility or
imbalance is a good example.  The speciﬁ-
cation of Equation 1¢ itself suggests this
ranking of policy objectives:  In the long
run, all gaps between actual and desired
levels will be zero, so the long-run policy
goal is to have the nominal target variable,
xt, grow at a rate equal to l0.
Revised Baseline Paths
The model described above may be
overly inﬂuenced by the assumption that the
monetary authority will pursue relentlessly a
levels target for xt without making allowances
for past surprises, as in Equation 2.  One
obvious alternative would be to aim for growth
in xt at the rate l0 period by period, rather
than try to correct unexpectedly strong or
weak past growth.   McCallum (1994) has
proposed bridging these two polar cases by
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making this period’s baseline level for xt a
weighted average of last period’s actual and
baseline levels:
(2¢)   
If d  = 1, past surprises always are cor-
rected and never accommodated. On the
other hand, if d  = 0, they are never corrected
and immediately accommodated. Gradual
accommodation takes place if d is between
zero and one.  The accommodation of past
surprises is called rebasing.
It may seem preferable to treat all past
shocks immediately as bygones, which could
be accomplished by setting d = 0.  This sort
of rebasing has been favored by McCallum
(1993, 1994) and Feldstein and Stock (1994)
for the following reason:  Instrument insta-
bility  would be reduced for any given value
of the feedback parameter, l1, and it should
be possible to use larger feedback values,
implying stronger feedback to the most
recent developments, without inducing
instrument instability. McCallum (1993)
ﬁnds in his simulation exercise for Japan
that some degree of rebasing can
reduce the variance of the nominal target
variable around the deﬁned target path.
One shortcoming of Equation 2¢  is that d  is
deﬁned to be constant over time. 
POLICY SIMULATIONS WITH
NOMINAL FEEDBACK RULES
The most widely analyzed NFR for
policy simulation is McCallum’s rule, in
which xt and bt denote nominal GNP and
the monetary base for the United States:
(3)
The target value of xt is allowed to
increase each quarter by 0.00739, so the
target level of nominal GNP increases by 3
percent per year, a rate close to the rate of
long-term annual growth in real GNP , in
which case average inﬂation would be
approximately zero. The second term acts
as a velocity forecast, which subtracts a
magnitude equal to the average growth
rate of base velocity over the previous four
years. McCallum (1994) argues that such
an average provides a correction for long-
lasting changes in velocity stemming from
regulatory and technological change. Cyclical
inﬂuences are accounted for by the last term.
A stimulative increase in base growth is
called for when the previous quarter’s level
of nominal GNP is below its target value.
To show that McCallum’s rule would
be able to keep nominal GNP close to a
steady target growth path and that the
ﬂuctuations around the mean growth rate
would be relatively small, McCallum con-
ducts simulations that include shocks in a
system consisting of the rule in Equation 3
and an equation depicting the response of
xt to the rule-generated values of bt:
(4)  
In McCallum’s simulation exercises,
the monetary base enters directly in the
equation for nominal output. Since in
macroeconomics there is no agreed-upon
model that tracks short-run dynamic
behavior of aggregate supply in response
to monetary actions, McCallum’s strategy
is to simulate his rule in Equation 3 with a
variety of different models for nominal
output, such as in Equation 4. In his study
of the U.S. economy, he uses two atheoretic
single-equation speciﬁcations, several vector
autoregressive systems, and three structural
models inspired by the real business-cycle
theory of Kydland and Prescott, the “mon-
etary misperceptions” theory of Lucas and
Barro, and the Keynesian theory based on
the Phillips curve.
The simulated root-mean-squared
error between nominal GNP and its target
level is used to illustrate how application
of the rule could stabilize nominal GNP
growth.  With his simulations for various
structural models, McCallum suggests that
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if the Federal Reserve had followed his
rule, the United States would have had
smaller ﬂuctuations in nominal GNP and
would have experienced zero inﬂation, on
average.3
International evidence for McCallum’s
rule is somewhat mixed. Hall (1990)
applied McCallum’s rule with a feedback
value of 0.25 to the United States, Canada,
Japan, and Germany. He found that if the
United States and Canada had followed
McCallum’s rule, signiﬁcant reductions 
in inﬂation could have been achieved. In
contrast, simulations of the rule for West
Germany and Japan indicated that the 
rule would have increased nominal GNP
variability around the trend. Hall’s results
show that modiﬁcation of the rule’s speciﬁ-
cation is often needed. One reason for
Hall’s disappointing results rests on the
choice of the feedback value.  McCallum
(1993) ﬁnds that a higher feedback value
than 0.25 is needed for Japan.
Judd and Motley (1992, 1993) and
McCallum (1990a, 1993, 1994) have
explored an alternative feedback rule in
which the central bank changes the short-
term interest rate in response to divergence
between actual and targeted nominal GDP
growth rates. These authors speciﬁed a
short-term interest rate as the instrument,
because it is controllable in the short-run
and because various central banks, notably
the Federal Reserve, have shown a prefer-
ence over the years for operating through
such an instrument rather than a reserves
aggregate.  The rule examined is speciﬁed
as follows:
(5)
In this equation, DRt is the quarterly change
of a short-term interest rate and Dxt-1 is the
growth rate in nominal GNP in the preceding
quarter. No forecasts are provided as in the
monetary base models.
Judd and Motley (1993) simulate the
above equation for the United States over
the sample 1960-89, a period in which
inﬂation averaged 5 
1–
2 percent. They ﬁnd
that when l = 0.2, inﬂation could have been
held between about zero and 2.5 percent if
the interest rate rule had been followed.
McCallum (1990a, 1993), on the other hand,
finds that the performance of policy rule (5)
is poor. Generally, when the feedback values,
l, are too low, the feedback mechanism
provides insufﬁcient corrective stimulus and
fails to keep nominal GNP close to the target
path. Otherwise, if l > 0.3, then explosive
oscillations occur.  Moreover, McCallum
ﬁnds that the stability of the policy rule in
Equation 5 is sensitive across the different
models of output. This is a disturbing result
since there is no generally accepted model
of how nominal variables are generated.
A repeated remark against the simula-
tions performed with NFRs is that they suffer
from the Lucas critique, which states that
the parameters used to simulate the data-
generating process for nominal variables
are calibrated in a world devoid of an NFR,
and they would change if an NFR were in
effect.  This point pertains to the class of
normative studies that attempt to make
policy statements based on counterfactual
simulations. A second type of critique con-
cerns  the robustness of the ﬁxed coefﬁcient
models such as Equation 4. It is well known
that monetary policy must cope with variable
lags and that the channels of the transmission
mechanism have been altered by innovations
in ﬁnancial services.  
INDICATOR MODELS WITH
NOMINAL FEEDBACK
Dueker and Fischer (1996a) suggest
that in countries with low average rates of
inﬂation, monetary policy might be well-
described by an NFR.  The claim is that an
implicit NFR, especially one with time-
varying parameters, can be a good model
of past policy and past data.  Countries
with a high inﬂation bias, in contrast, are
not likely to have conducted monetary
policy in a way that is well described by a
monetary rule.   Such indicator models do
not suggest that the monetary authorities
have followed an NFR exactly; instead, the
NFR indicator model provides information
regarding the implicit objectives embedded
in past and present policy actions.  Thus, the
goal of the indicator model is to provide a




3 Using the same rule as
Equation 3, McCallum (1990b)
conducts simulations of a
model of the U.S. economy as
it was in the 1923-41 period.
The simulation results suggest
that a monetary base rule could
have prevented the Great
Depression if the rule had been
in effect.
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4 The Markov process is assumed
to be inﬂuenced by an unob-
served random variable s*
t ,
which will be called the state or
regime that the process was in
at date t.  If s*
t = 0, then the
process is in regime 1 with
mean sm1, while s*
t = 1
means that the process is in
regime 2 with mean sm2.
Note s*
t takes on only discrete
values deﬁned by the Markov
chain. For a ﬁrst-order Markov
chain with transition probabili-
ties {pij }, the probability that st
equals some particular value j
depends only on the most
recent value:
The basic ﬁltering and smooth-
ing algorithms for a Markov-
switching model are discussed













guide for monetary policy discussion by
illustrating whether current policy actions
are geared toward increasing, decreasing,
or maintaining the baseline rate of inﬂation
identiﬁed by the NFR indicator model.
In the indicator models, the parameters
from the NFR are estimated so that we may
know the properties of the NFR that best
describe past policy.  In simulation exercises,
in contrast, the parameters are arbitrarily
fixed.  A further distinguishing feature of
the NFR-indicator models is that the coef-
ﬁcients can be time-varying and, therefore,
the model is able to adapt to shifts in the
weights given to alternative objectives.
For example, in small open economies, it
is likely that the rate of domestic price
inﬂation cannot always be the overriding
policy objective.  At times, the exchange
rate can become the focus of monetary
policy when shocks push it out of line
with fundamentals.  Thus, it is important
that the indicator model permits shifts in
the feedback parameters that reﬂect shifts
in the weights attached to alternative
policy objectives.
Dueker and Fischer (1996a,b) have
constructed NFR indicator models that allow
the parameters to vary over time via Markov







All of the coefﬁcients are subject to
change according to a Markov-switching
process.4 For application to Switzerland,
the monetary base is the policy-instrument
variable. Equation 6 implies that expected
inﬂation in any period equals the baseline rate,
l0, plus possible adjustments due to the
gap between the baseline and actual price
levels, (p*– p)t – 1, and to the gap between
the baseline and actual exchange rates,
(e*– e)t – 1.  The baseline rate of inﬂation, l0,
is deﬁned as the backward-looking, short-term
trend rate of inﬂation.  This interpretation
of the time-varying parameter l0 reﬂects
the persistence in price inﬂation.  Once
unanticipated shocks have raised or lowered
the inﬂation rate, it will remain above or
below normal for some time so that policy
actions can only gradually adjust the base-
line inﬂation rate.
Equations 7 and 8 deﬁne the baseline
paths for prices and the exchange rate to
be a weighted average of last period’s base-
line and actual values plus trend growth.
Such revisions of the baseline occur for
values of d < 1. Consequently, shifts in the
baseline path are gradually accommodated.
As d  decreases from one, the rate of
accommodation increases. 




This section illustrates an application
of the indicator model of Dueker and Fis-
cher (1996a), which is outlined in the
previous section.  The purpose of this
exercise is to explain variation in the rate
of monetary base growth for Switzerland
by estimating changes in the baseline rate
of inﬂation and the baseline exchange rate.
The model’s results will help us answer
such questions as whether a shift in base
growth appeared to stem primarily from
inﬂation factors, exchange-rate considera-
tions, or a shift in base velocity.  The model,
which uses the monthly growth in the Swiss
monetary base as the instrument variable,
is estimated for the period 1972:1 through
1987:12.  The primary policy objective is
assumed to be domestic price inﬂation, as
measured by the consumer price index.
The exchange rate, as measured by the
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Swiss franc-Deutsche mark rate, is treated
as the second policy objective.  As a test of
model robustness, we use the parameters
estimated from the 1972:1-1987:12 period
to examine the out-of-sample behavior of
model-implied money growth for the period
1989:7-1994:4.  An 18-month gap (1988:1-
1989:6) between the in-sample and the
out-of-sample observations remains, because
the monetary base experienced a permanent
shock affecting reserves demand beginning
in January 1988.  The shock to reserve
demand stemmed from two sources: a
reduction in reserve requirements and the
introduction of the Swiss Interbanking
Clearing (SIC) system.  During this transi-
tion period, reserves fell from a peak of 10
to three billion Swiss francs.  If the model
parameters from the 1970s and 1980s remain
useful for analyzing Swiss money growth
following this shock, then the indicator
model is relatively insensitive to regulatory
changes and ﬁnancial innovations in the
payments system.
Estimates of the baseline inﬂation path
for Switzerland reveal an average rate of
2.4 percent per year from 1972 to 1987.
Because the feedback parameter for prices,
l1,  is small, monetary base growth between
1973 and 1987 appeared to respond primarily
to expected changes in base velocity, variation
in the baseline inﬂation rate, and occasionally
to the gap between actual and baseline
exchange rates.  Figure 1 plots a one-year
moving average of inﬂation in Switzerland,
a one-year moving average of the model-
implied baseline inﬂation rate, and the yield
on long-term government bonds in Switzer-
land.  It shows that the model-implied
baseline inﬂation rate corresponds better
than actual inﬂation to changes in the gov-
ernment bond rate.  The relatively close
match between movements in the baseline
inﬂation rate and the government bond
rate suggests that the baseline inﬂation
rate provides a useful estimate of the
underlying trend rate of inﬂation, which is
the most important factor in determining
the yield on long-term nominal bonds.
It is also interesting to examine periods
when relatively large gaps developed between
actual and baseline inﬂation in Figure 1.
The ﬁrst oil shock in 1973-74 sent inﬂation
to a level well above the baseline rate, as
one might expect from a supply shock.  A
second oil shock in 1979 led to a similar but
smaller positive gap between actual and
baseline inﬂation.  Throughout the 1970s,
Switzerland’s main trading partners tended
to experience even greater inﬂationary
pressures, so that the Swiss franc tended to
appreciate, a situation which led monetary
policymakers to be concerned with the
exchange rate on several occasions.  A pos-
itive supply shock pushed actual inﬂation
below the baseline rate in 1986 when oil
prices fell substantially.  As the baseline
trend would predict, however, actual inﬂa-
tion returned to the baseline rate within a
relatively short period.  
Figure 2 plots the model-implied feed-
back parameter for the exchange-rate gap,
l2.  The model identiﬁes three periods
when monetary policy appeared to respond
to the exchange rate in the 1970s.  The
ﬁrst period in 1972 corresponds with the
tail end of the Bretton Woods system of
generally ﬁxed exchange rates.  The
second period saw relatively minor
exchange-rate feedback in 1974-75 and
came on the heels of the ﬁrst oil shock.
The third period, which saw the greatest
amount of exchange-rate feedback to base
growth, was 1978-79.  By 1978 the Swiss
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the Deutsche mark, and policymakers
became concerned about possible harm to
the real economy brought by the high real
exchange rate.  Thus, throughout 1978
base growth was increased in response to
the desire to dampen the appreciation of
the Swiss franc.  As the risk of inﬂation
increased, and the Swiss franc began to
depreciate, monetary policy renewed its
focus on price stability in early 1979.  The
model does not detect any signiﬁcant
exchange-rate feedback to base growth
since 1979.  
To see if the indicator model provides
useful information in an out-of-sample con-
text,  which is where real-world policy
decisions must be made, we use the model
estimated with data from 1972-87 to analyze
data from the 1989:7-1994:4 period.  Figure 3
updates Figure 1 with plots of a one-year
moving average of actual inﬂation,  the model-
implied baseline inﬂation rate, and the
government bond rate.  The chart shows
that actual inﬂation and the model-implied
baseline rate moved more closely together
in the 1990s than in the 1970s and 1980s.
It appears that external supply shocks 
have not played a large role in creating
wedges between the baseline rate and
actual inﬂation in the 1990s.  Interestingly,
the model-implied baseline inﬂation rate
accelerated from a little more than 3 percent
to almost 5 percent between July and
November in 1989.  Thus, the indicator model
signalled a clear build-up in inﬂationary
pressures at a time of considerable uncer-
tainty regarding base demand.  With respect
to the disinﬂation that began in 1991, the
indicator model closely matches the gradu-
alist movements of actual inﬂation.  By
mid-1994, the model-implied baseline inﬂa-
tion rate had descended to slightly less than
1 percent, which is, for all practical purposes,
price stability, given the well-known slight
upward bias in the consumer price index.
The government bond rate, in contrast,  has
followed the global trend by increasing,  on
average, since late 1993, despite the fact
that inﬂationary pressures have remained
subdued in almost all major economies.  
CONCLUSIONS
Nominal feedback rules were developed
in response to the apparent shortcomings
in constant-money-growth rules and to the
inﬂationary bias in purely discretionary
monetary policy.  McCallum has argued
that monetary policy based on his rule is
more likely than a constant-money-growth
rate rule to achieve the fundamental economic
goal of price stability, because the feedback
mechanism is able to produce stronger
countercyclical effects on aggregate demand
and is able to guard itself against the con-
sequences of ﬁnancial and regulatory changes.
However, because it appears that monetary
JULY/AUGUST  1998
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authorities are as unlikely to relinquish their
discretionary powers to an NFR as they were
to constant-money-growth rules, a more
promising avenue for NFRs is their use as
indicators for monetary policy.  Rather than
stating that policy should follow a speciﬁc,
inviolable rule, indicator models with nom-
inal  feedback can be used as a reference guide.
As highlighted in the previous section, the
indicator model allows the monetary
authorities to consult the recommendations
of an NFR-indicator model when analyzing
current monetary conditions.  
To illustrate the use of an NFR-indicator
model as a useful policy tool, we sketch
the results from Dueker and Fischer (1996a)
concerning Swiss monetary policy.  The
NFR-indicator model provides a useful
estimate of the baseline inﬂation path
embedded in recent decisions concerning
base growth.  We show that the baseline
inﬂation path matches fairly well with
shifts in the Swiss government bond rate,
which is recognized generally as an impor-
tant inﬂation bellwether.  Hence, by referring
to an NFR-indicator model, policymakers
have a tool that is independent of market
expectations to help them understand the
signal they are sending ﬁnancial markets
regarding the inﬂation outlook.  
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